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Abstract
This paper investigates the link between development, economic growth, and the
economic losses from natural disasters in a normative analytical framework, with an
illustration on hurricane flood risks in New Orleans. It concludes that, where capital
accumulates through increased density of capital at risk in a given area, it is optimal
for (i) the probability of disaster occurrence to decrease with income; (ii) the capital
at risk — and thus the economic losses in case of disaster — to increase faster than
economic growth; (iii) the average annual losses to grow faster than income at low
levels of development and slower than income at high levels of development. In that
case, increasing risk-taking reinforces economic growth, and improving protections
transfer risks from frequent low-intensity events to rarer high-impact events. These
findings are robust to a broad range of modeling choices and parameter values, and
to the inclusion of risk aversion. Risk-taking is both a driver and a consequence
of economic development, and should not be indiscriminately suppressed. The observation of a trend in disaster losses should not be confused with the presence of
excessive risk taking. In a descriptive framework, suboptimal decision-making (the
introduction of prospect theory’s decision weights, biases in risk perception and myopic expectations) may amplify these trends and lead to excessive or insufficient risk
taking. In all instances, the world is very likely to experience fewer but more costly
disasters in the future.
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1 Introduction
The damages caused by Hurricane Sandy in Haiti and in the US show that poor and rich
countries are vulnerable to natural hazards. Large damages in New York City and New
Jersey — with a preliminary estimate of direct damages in excess of $50 billion — raise
questions on the level of coastal protection in these areas and on the rapid coastal developments that have driven so many households and so much capital and infrastructure in
risky areas. In spite of large financial and technical resources, the economic vulnerability to hurricanes remain high in the richest country of the world, and statistical analyses
suggest it has been growing in the last hundred years (Pielke et al., 2008).
This is not an isolated situation. Increasing investments in disaster risk reduction have
lead to a significant reduction in human casualties (Kahn, 2005; Kellenberg and Mobarak,
2008), but economic losses from natural disasters have been growing as fast or even faster
than economic growth in many countries; see for instance statistical analyses in Barredo
(2009), Miller et al. (2008), Neumayer and Barthel (2010), Nordhaus (2010), Pielke et
al. (2008), and Bouwer et al. (2007). Climate change is not responsible of this evolution
(Schmidt et al., 2009; Neumayer and Barthel, 2010; Bouwer, 2011; IPCC, 2011). The
trend in hurricane losses relative to wealth in the US is for instance fully explained by
migrations toward hurricane-prone areas and increasing population wealth (Pielke et al.,
2008). Globally, there is a trend toward more risk taking: between 1970 and 2010, global
population grew by 87%, but the population living in flood plains increased by 114% and
in cyclone prone coastlines by 192%. The GDP exposed to tropical cyclones increased
from 3.6 percent of total GDP to 4.3 percent over the same period (UN-ISDR, 2011).
This global trend in economic disaster losses is a major concern in many countries.
Disaster losses represent an increasing burden on economies and public finances (e.g.,
Benson and Clay, 2004; Loayza et al., 2009; Fomby et al. 2011; Strobl 2011), and their
trend threatens the functioning of insurance and reinsurance markets (e.g., Michel-Kerjan,
2010). Cross-country studies have suggested that economic disaster losses are increasing less rapidly than income, making them easier to manage (Toya and Skidmore, 2007;
Mendelsohn et al., 2011). But the trend in economic losses in the US and many other
countries suggests that the relationship between economic growth and disaster vulnerability is more complex than these studies suggest, and that the economic vulnerability to
disasters may not always decrease with income (Schumacher and Strobl, 2011).
This paper investigates the interlinkages between economic disaster losses and development, first in a normative and optimal framework, and then accounting for suboptimal
behaviors. It considers the fact that higher income makes it possible to invest in better
protections against disasters, but may also lead to higher investment in at risk areas. It
also considers the role of investments in at risk areas in contributing to economic growth,
for instance because development of coastal areas is critical for export-led growth or be-
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cause agglomeration externality and urbanization (often in flood plains) are major drivers
of development (Ciccone et al., 1996; Ciccone, 2002; World Bank 2008). Compared with
previous investigations of trends in disaster economic losses (e.g., Lewis and Nickerson,
1989; Schumacher and Strobl, 2011), this analysis proposes an explicit modeling of risk
taking (how much is invested in risky areas?) and of protection investment (how much is
invested in protection?), to characterize the two-way link between economic growth and
disaster losses. It does so in a more general framework than previous studies, and it confirms the robustness of its results by investigating the role of risk aversion and different
forms of behavioral bias.
In a normative and optimal framework — and assuming no change in climate conditions and hazard characteristics — risk-taking generally increases with development.
Natural disasters are likely to become more destructive in the future, even relative to
income, and even in the presence of risk aversion. Reciprocally, increased risk-taking
reinforces economic growth, suggesting that risk taking should not be indiscriminately
suppressed. Risk-taking is both a driver and a consequence of economic development.
In this optimal context, average annual losses from disasters grow with income, and they
grow faster than income at low levels of development and slower than income at high
levels of development. In a descriptive framework that includes biases in risk perception
and decision-making, these trends can be amplified, and risk taking can be excessive or
insufficient, providing a rationale for public action.
The next section describes the most generic model and the conditions under which
disaster losses increase with economic growth. Section 3 presents more detailed results
for specific specification of protection costs, and Section 4 investigates special cases of
production functions. Section 5 applies this model to New Orleans, demonstrating that
reasonable parameter values lead to a situation where economic growth incentivizes risk
taking and increases disaster losses. Section 6 shows that these results remain valid with
imperfect decision-making. Section 7 concludes.

2 Development and natural risks
It is generally accepted that richer populations invest more to protect themselves from
natural hazards. A richer population, however, may also invest more in at-risk areas,
increasing exposure to natural hazards. These two trends have opposite impacts on risk,
and the resulting trend in risk is thus ambiguous. This trend is investigated in this section
with a simple model.
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2.1 A general economic growth framework
We assume there are two categories of capital. Capital R represents the capital related
to activities that need to be (or benefit from being) located in areas that are potentially at
risk of flooding. There are two categories of such capital. First, some activities directly
depend on being in risky areas, such as ports that are located in coastal areas or river
flood plains. Second, positive concentration externality is making it profitable to invest
in at-risk areas even in sectors that are not directly dependent on being at risk — such
as finance in New York City or manufacturing in Shenzhen — to benefit from spill-overs
from the industry that need to be located in flood-prone areas (such as ports): (i) lower
long-distance transport cost; (ii) infrastructure for local transportation, water, energy, and
communication; (iii) large labor market with access to skilled workers; and (iv) access to
public services and amenities (art and culture, schools, university, etc.).
Capital S represents the rest of economy, which can be located in safe locations without loss of productivity. These two capitals are inputs in the production function:
Y = eγt F (R, S)

(1)

where t is time, F is a production function and γ is the exogenous growth in total factor productivity. Classically, we assume that ∂R F (R, S) > 0; ∂S F (R, S) > 0;
∂R2 F (R, S) < 0 and ∂S2 F (R, S) < 0 (decreasing returns).
The capital R can be affected by hazards, like floods and windstorms. If a hazard
is strong enough, it causes damages to the capital installed in at-risk areas, and can be
labeled as a disaster. We assume that in that case, a fraction X of capital R is destroyed.
It is assumed that this is the only consequence of disasters.2
These disasters (i.e. hazards that lead to capital destruction) have a probability p0
of occurring every year, except if protection investments reduce this probability. These
protection investments take many forms, depending on which hazard is considered. Flood
protections include dikes and seawalls, but also drainage systems to cope with heavy
precipitations in urban areas. Windstorm protections consist mainly in building retrofits
and stricter building norms, to ensure that old and new buildings can resist stronger winds.
It is assumed that better defenses reduce the probability of disasters, but do not reduce
their consequences.3 This is consistent with many types of defenses. For instance, seawalls can protect an area up to a design standard of protection but often fail totally if this
2

Disaster fatalities and casualties are not considered in this simple model, assuming that early warning,
evacuation and emergency services can avoid them, which is consistent with the observation that disaster
deaths decrease with income, at least above a certain income level (Kahn, 2005; Kellenberg and Mobarak,
2008). Human losses could be taken into account if it is assumed that fatalities and casualties can be
measured by an equivalent economic loss, which is highly controversial; see a discussion in Viscusi and
Aldy (2003).
3
This is equivalent to the self-protection of Ehrlich and Becker (1972).
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standard is exceeded; building norms allow houses to resist up to a certain wind speed,
but when this wind speed is exceeded, houses are completely damaged and require total
rebuilding. This modeling choice is made without loss of generality, if there is no risk
aversion.4 In that case, indeed, reducing the probability of a disaster or the consequences
in case of disaster is equivalent.
Better defenses are also more expensive, and the annual cost of defenses C increases
when the remaining disaster probability p decrease.5 The function C(p, R) is assumed
twice differentiable, C(p0 , R) = 0 (the probability of occurrence is p0 in the absence
of protections), ∂R C(p, R) ≥ 0 (it is as or more expensive to protect more capital),
∂p C(p, R) ≤ 0 (the cost increases when the probability decrease), ∂p2 C(p, R) ≥ 0 and
C(0, R) = +∞ (the marginal cost is increasing and it is impossible to reduce the prob2
ability to zero) and ∂pR
C(p, R) ≤ 0 (the cost of protecting more capital increases when
the probability decreases).
Any given year, the economic surplus π is given by:
π = eγt F (R, S) − C(p, R) − L − r(R + S)

(2)

where r is the interest rate, L is the losses from disasters, and is given by a random
draw with probability p. If a disaster occurs, losses are equal to XR, i.e. a fraction X of
the capital located in the risky area is destroyed. Any given year, the expected loss E[L]
is equal to pXR and the expected output is equal to:
E[π] = eγt F (R, S) − C(p, R) − (r + pX)R − rS

(3)

Note that in this equation, disaster losses appear as an additional cost of capital at risk,
in addition to the interest rate r.
We also define the risk-free situation as a situation in which there is no risk, either
because p0 = 0 (no hazard), because X = 0 (no vulnerability), or because C(p, R) = 0
(costless protections). In the risk-free situation, there are still two capitals R and S, but
none of them is at risk.

2.2 Optimal choice of p, R, and S
We assume that a social planner — or an equivalent decentralized decision-making process — decides which amounts of capital R and S are to be located in the risky and safe
areas, and the level of protection (p and C(p, R)) that is to be built. Its program is:6
4

The role of risk aversion is investigated in Appendix B.
The probability p here includes both the probability that an event exceeds protection capacities, and the
defense failure probability, even for weaker events.
6
This model is more general than the model of Schumacher and Strobl (2011). In the latter, the only
decision concerns protection investments that mitigate disaster consequences, and there is no benefit from
5
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(4)

We assume first that there is no risk aversion and we assume that the expected surplus
is maximized. From the social planner’s perspective, doing so is acceptable if disaster
losses remain small compared with aggregated income, consistently with the Arrow-Lind
theorem for public investment decisions (Arrow and Lind, 1970). As discussed in Mahul
and Ghesquiere (2007), this theorem holds only if some conditions are met, including if
disaster losses can be pooled among a large enough population (e.g., a large country), and
with many other uncorrelated risks, i.e. in the presence of comprehensive insurance coverage or post-disaster government support, or if disaster losses can be smoothed over time
thanks to savings and borrowing (i.e. self-insurance) or reinsurance. In other terms, the
optimal pathways determined by this analysis are valid assuming that the social planner
ensures that individual losses remain small thanks to temporal smoothing and redistribution or insurance across individuals. Appendix B investigates the case with risk aversion.
If p = p0 , then there is no protection in place — because protections are too expensive
— and the situation is highly simplified: disaster risk reduces by a fixed fraction the
productivity of the capital at risk. Classically, this reduces the amount of such capital
without influencing its growth rate on the balanced growth pathway. In the following, we
assume that p < p0 .
First order conditions lead to the optimal values of p, R, and S:

eγt ∂R F (R, S) − ∂R C − (pX + r) = 0

(5)

eγt ∂S F (R, S) − r = 0

(6)

∂p C = −XR

(7)

While the marginal productivity of capital S is r, the marginal productivity of capital
R is ∂R C + pX + r, i.e. the cost of capital r plus the capital losses due to disasters pX
plus the incremental cost of protection ∂R C. The term ∂R C + pX + r is what we define
as the risk-adjusted cost of capital, and it is larger than the risk-free cost of capital, to
account for natural risks.7
Since pX > 0, ∂R C > 0, and ∂R F is decreasing, the first equation shows that the
presence of risk (X > 0 and C > 0) leads to a reduction in R.
taking risks and thus no trade-off between safety and income. This model also differs from Hallegatte
(2011) in that it is more general on the shape of production and protection cost functions, and it introduces
the interest rate to account for the consumption–investment trade-off.
7
Equivalently, one can define the risk-adjusted marginal productivity of capital as the marginal productivity of capital reduced by the cost of protection and disaster capital losses: eγt ∂R F (R, S) − ∂R C − pX.
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Proposition 1 The presence of risk and the possibility to protect lead to a reduction in
the capital that is located in the risky area, compared with the risk-free situation.
Taking the derivative of the three equations with respect to time t, one gets:

2
2
γeγt ∂R F + [eγt ∂R2 F − ∂R2 C]∂t R + eγt ∂RS
F ∂t S = (X + ∂pR
C)∂t p

(8)

2
eγt ∂S2 F ∂t S + eγt ∂RS
F ∂t R = 0
2
2
∂t p∂p C = −(X + ∂pR
C)∂t R

(9)

γt

γe ∂S F +

(10)

2
Equation (10) shows that if (X + ∂pR
C) < 0, then an increase of at-risk capital
(everything else being unchanged) leads to a decrease in protection (i.e. an increase in
the probability of occurrence), because the cost of protection then increases more rapidly
2
with R and p than the avoided disaster losses. If X + ∂pR
C = 0, then the probability of
occurrence is independent of R, and thus constant over time even in presence of economic
growth.
If we have
2
(X + ∂pR
C) > 0 ,
(11)

then having more capital at risk leads to an increase in protection, and the probability
of occurrence p and the amount of capital at risk R evolve in opposite direction. In the
following, we assume that this condition is met.
Replacing ∂t p in Eq. (8) and replacing eγt ∂R F by (r + pX + ∂R C) gives:
∂t R =
Since

2 F
∂RS
2F
∂S

γ(r(1 −
−eγt (∂R2 F −

2 F
∂RS
2F )
∂S

+ pX + ∂R C)

2 F )2
(∂RS
)
2F
∂S

+ ∂R2 C −

2 C)2
(X+∂pR
∂p2 C

(12)

< 1, the capital at risk increases over time when:
−eγt (∂R2 F −

2
2
(X + ∂pR
C)2
(∂RS
F )2
2
)
>
−∂
C
+
R
∂S2 F
∂p2 C

(13)

To interpret this inequality, we can disregard for now the interactions between R and
2
S (i.e. assuming that ∂RS
F = 0) and assume that protection costs are independent of R
2
2
(i.e. ∂R C = 0 and ∂pR C = 0). In this case, the capital at risk increases over time when:
−eγt ∂R2 F >

X2
∂p2 C

(14)

This inequality is verified if the marginal productivity of the capital at risk decreases
more rapidly with R than the marginal cost of protection increases with p. In this same
situation, the probability of disaster decreases with economic growth.

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2013

7

Fondazione
Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 780 [2013]
2.3 Trend in average
annual losses

8

2
Proposition 2 If X + ∂pR
C > 0 and if the concavity of the production function is high
enough — or if the convexity of the protection costs is high enough — then economic
growth leads to an increase in capital at risk (i.e. an increase in losses when a disaster occurs), and a decrease in the probability of occurrence. If the concavity is lower,
then economic growth leads to a decrease in capital at risk (and an increase in disaster
probability).

It is interesting to note that — counter-intuitively — the capital at risk increases over
time when the production function concavity is high (i.e. returns of capital at risk are
rapidly decreasing), and decreases otherwise.
Note that if development leads to a reduction in capital at risk R and an increase in p,
then at one point the economy reaches a situation where there is no protection and p = p0 .
In such a situation, as already stated, capital at risk R grows at the same rate than in the
risk-free situation.
The capital R in the risk-free situation is referred to as Rs , and its evolution is:
∂t Rs =

γ(r(1 −

2 F
∂RS
2 F ))
∂S

−eγt (∂R2 F −

2 F )2
(∂RS
)
2F
∂S

(15)

Assuming that the capital R increases with economic growth, i.e. that condition (13) is
verified, then the comparison of Eqs. (12) and (15) explains how the protection influences
the evolution of capital:
• The term pX + ∂R C in the numerator is the impact of risk and protection marginal
costs on marginal productivity; it increases the numerator and accelerates the absolute growth in R.
• The term ∂R2 C in the denominator is the decreasing or increasing return on protection; if the returns on protection are constant (e.g. C(p, R) = RC(p) or C(p, R) =
C(p)), then this term does not exist; if the returns are decreasing (i.e. costs are
convex and ∂R2 C > 0), then this term increases the denominator and slows down
the growth in R; if the returns are increasing, then the growth in R is accelerated.
(X+∂ 2 C)2

• The term − ∂ 2pR
in the denominator is the impact of the change in protection
pC
that is provided if more capital is installed in at risk areas (if the probability of
occurrence is fixed, this term does not appear). Since ∂p2 C > 0, this term is negative
and reduces the denominator and thus accelerate the growth in R.

2.3 Trend in average annual losses
The average economic losses due to disasters are equal to E[L] = pXR.
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∂t E[L] = XR∂t p + pX∂t R

9

(16)

It can be rewritten:


∂t E[L] = ∂t p ∂p C −

p∂p2 C
1+

2 C
∂pR
X




(17)

Since ∂p C < 0 and ∂p2 C > 0, and under condition (11), then E[L] and p evolve in
opposite directions.
2
Proposition 3 If X + ∂pR
C > 0, then average annual disaster losses increase when the
probability of occurrence decreases over time.

This result highlights the need to consider the combination of exposure (R) and probability (p) to investigate risks. In particular, a reduction in the probability of occurrence
does not mean that average losses decrease; on the opposite, this general analysis suggests
that under mild conditions a decrease in the probability of occurrence leads to an increase
in average losses, because of the increase in capital at risk.
Importantly, this analysis illustrates that protection reduces the hazard (the probability of occurrence of an event), but its impact on risk is more complex, because it also
increases exposure (here, the capital at risk R). As a result, protection transfers part of
the risk from one kind of risk (frequent and low-cost events) to another kind (exceptional
and high-impact events), a process already stressed in Etkin (1999).

3 Special cases for protection costs
We already made assumptions on the shape of C(p, R), but it is useful to explore two
extreme cases for the dependence of C(p, R) to R.
In a first case, we can consider a coast or a river, where additional capital investments
are done at a fixed density and are thus using additional land, which in turn requires
additional protection. In such a case, the protected areas increases proportionally with
the invested capital in the risky zone, and C(p, R) = RC̃(p). This is the case in Florida,
or in the south of France, where population density is low and flood exposure increases
mainly through the construction of individual houses, at low density. This situation can
be labeled “horizontal” or “area-increasing” accumulation.
In a second case, we consider a given risky areas, which is protected against coastal
floods and where investment takes place. In such a case, the risky and protected area does
not increase with investments, and the cost of protection is independent of the amount of
protected capital: C(p, R) = C̃(p). This is notably the case where additional investments
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take place through higher concentration and density, on a given area. Examples of such
places are the Netherlands, New Orleans, or Manhattan in New York City. This situation
can be labeled “vertical” or “density-increasing” accumulation.
Let us explore the consequence of these two patterns on flood risks.

3.1 Horizontal accumulation
In that case, we can assume that the protection cost function has the form C(p, R) =
RC̃(p). The marginal cost and benefit of protection are equal (Eq. (7)), which means
R∂p C̃(p) = −XR. Therefore, p is independent of R and constant over time.
2
Deriving the previous equation with respect to R gives X + ∂pR
C = 0, and we can
rewrite Eq. (5) as:
r′

z
}|
{
eγt ∂R F (R, S) = C̃(p) + pX + r

(18)

Since C̃(p) is constant and positive, the risk-adjusted marginal productivity r ′ is also a
constant, larger than r. In this case, R evolves like a capital without risk, but with a larger
interest rate r ′ instead of r. Since marginal productivity needs to be larger, the amount of
capital is lower in presence of decreasing returns (R < Rs ), i.e. risk leads to a reduction
in capital R. With classical production functions (CES or Cobb-Douglas) and neutral
technological change, the capital at risk R increases at the same rate as economic growth.
Since p is constant, ∂t E[L] = pX∂t R, and average annual losses grow at the same rate as
capital at risk and as risk-free economic growth.
Proposition 4 In horizontal-accumulation locations — i.e. where flood exposure increases because the developed area at risk is expanded and where protection costs increase therefore proportionally with protected capital — rational decision-making leads
to annual flood losses growing at the same rate as economic growth, with a constant
flood probability, regardless of how protection costs vary with the residual probability of
occurrence.

3.2 Vertical accumulation
In that case, we can assume that C(p, R) = ξp−ν + C0 . Assuming p < p0 , we can use
Eq. (7) to find:
p=



RX
νξ

1
− 1+ν

(19)

2
2
We have ∂pR
C = 0, and thus X + ∂pR
C > 0 if there is risk, so that condition (11) is
always verified. As a consequence, we know that p and R evolve in opposite directions:
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if capital increases (resp. decreases), the protection is improved (resp. weakened) and
disaster probability decreases (resp. decreases). We are in the situation where p decreases
and R increases when condition (13) is verified, and it can be rewritten:
−eγt (∂R2 F −

2
(∂RS
F )2
X 2 pν+2
)
>
∂S2 F
ν(ν + 1)ξ

(20)

Also, we know from the general analysis that ∂t E[L] is positive and average disaster
losses are increasing over time.
Proposition 5 In locations where flood exposure rises as a result of increased density in a
given protected area (e.g., New Orleans), rational decision-making results in a continuous
increase in annual flood losses, when flood probability decreases over time.
To know whether capital at risk and flood losses grow more or less rapidly than economic growth, assumptions are needed on the shape of the production function. This is
what is investigated in the next section.

4 Special cases for the production function
In this section, we keep the “vertical-accumulation” assumption, i.e. C(p, R) = ξp−ν +
C0 . All qualitative results are however valid if C(p, R) = ξRc p−ν + C0 , where 0 ≤ c <
1. We will assume that capital at risk R and safe capital S are separable inputs in the
production function (the Cobb-Douglas case is explored in Appendix A).
2
If F (R, S) = f (R) + g(S), then ∂RS
F = 0, and all equations can be simplified.
The evolution of the capital at risk is:
∂t R =

γ(r + pX + ∂R C)
−eγt ∂R2 f (R)

+

∂R2 C

−

2 C)2
(X+∂pR
2
∂p C

(21)

In absence of risk and protection, the evolution would be:
∂t Rs =

γr
−eγt ∂R2 f (Rs )

(22)

We can also calculate ∂t S as:
∂t S =

γr
−eγt ∂S2 g(S)

(23)

If we now assume that f (R) = λRµ and g(S) = αλS µ , we can solve Eq. (6):
1

γt

−1

S = (αλµ) 1−µ e 1−µ r 1−µ
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and we have:
∂t S
∂t RS
γ
=
=
(25)
S
S
R
1−µ
So, with this shape of production function, a productivity growth at rate γ leads to a
γ
γ
(i.e. Rs and S grow at rate 1−µ
).
risk-free economic growth at rate 1−µ
1
 − 1+ν
, we can rewrite Eq. (5):
With p = RX
νξ
γt

e λµR

µ−1

= r + pX = r + X



X
νξ

1
− 1+ν

1

R− 1+ν

(26)

This equation cannot be solved analytically, but its behavior in special cases can be
analyzed.

4.1 Low development level
If productivity is low, capital is also limited (R is small) and thus the probability of occurrence of a disaster is large (p is large).8 In such an extreme situation, the capital interest
rate r is small in the at-risk area compared with the flood-related capital losses pX, and
Eq.(26) can be simplified by removing r, leading to the solution:
ν

γ

R(t) = R0 e 1+ν −µ

t

(27)

ν
, R decreases and p increases over time, until it reaches p0 , i.e. the absence
If µ > 1+ν
of protection. Then, capital at risk grows at the same rate as risk-free economic growth.
ν
In the situation in which protection improves over time, µ < 1+ν
, the growth rate
γ
γ
of capital at risk is ν −µ , which is always larger than 1−µ . In this case, therefore, the
1+ν
capital at risk grows more rapidly than the safe capital and risk-free income. The relative
vulnerability of the economy can be measured by the amount of disaster losses when a
disaster occurs divided by income or by the “fraction at risk”, i.e. the share of capital
at risk R in total capital R + S. This vulnerability is increasing over time, as shown in
Fig.1. Interestingly, the growth in capital at risk is more rapid when ν is smaller, i.e.
when the convexity of protection costs is lower and protection costs increase slowly with
the protection level.
Average losses pXR have a growth rate equal to:
8

We assume here that p0 is large, i.e. that the area-at-risk has a large flood probability in absence of
protection, and that p < p0 . If productivity is so low that p = p0 , then pX can be replaced by p0 X, which
is independent of R. Then, Eq. (26) can be simplified by replacing its right-hand-side by r + p0 X = r′ .
In this situation, the capital at risk is lower than in absence of risk (R < Rs ), but it grows at the same
rate. When development increases productivity, there is a time when protection is such that p < p0 , and the
following calculation holds if p0 is large enough.
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Figure 1: Evolution of the “fraction at risk”, i.e. the share of capital at risk R in total
capital R + S, as a function of time. The fraction at risk increases with development, until
it stabilizes at high development level. Calculations using numerical values from New
Orleans (see Section 5) and α = 2.
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γ
1 − µ 1+ν
ν
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(28)

ν
In the situation in which protection improves over time, µ < 1+ν
, average losses
γ
increase over time, and they increase more rapidly than 1−µ and thus more rapidly than
risk-free economic growth, i.e. the growth rate of Rs and S (in other terms, the income
elasticity of average annual losses is larger than one).
So, in this case, annual disaster losses grow more rapidly than risk-free economic
growth at low levels of development, when disaster losses dominate the interest rate in the
assessment of the cost of capital, and when the returns on capital at risk are decreasing
rapidly, more rapidly than a limit value defined by the shape of the production costs.
In that case, the economic surplus (generated by the at-risk capital) is

E[π] = eγt F (R, S) − C(p, R) − (r + pX)R
and is growing at the same rate as losses, i.e. 1−µγ1+ν . It means that the process of
ν
increasing risk-taking leads to a growth in economic surplus that is more rapid than riskfree economic growth. So, increasing risk-taking is also a driver of economic growth
(even though the presence of risk leads to a lower output, see proposition 1).
Note that this case is equivalent to the case explored in Hallegatte (2011) where the
total amount of capital (R + S) is fixed at an exogenous level K, and is independent of
the risk level (which is equivalent to r = 0 provided that R ≤ K). It is a situation in
which there is no consumption–investment trade-off, and in which the capital at risk can
keep increasing more rapidly than growth, until all the capital is located in the risky area.
What follows shows that accounting for the consumption–investment trade-off changes
significantly the results at high level of development.

4.2 High development level
At a high development level, capital productivity is large, and the amount of capital at
risk R is large.9 As a consequence, the probability of occurrence (p) is small. In such
an extreme situation, the capital interest rate r is large compared with flood-related capital losses pX, and Eq.(26) can be simplified by removing pX, leading to the risk-free
solution:
γ

R(t) = R0 e 1−µ t

(29)

9

Using a reductio ad absurdum argument, it is easy to show from Eq. (26) that R tends toward infinity
when productivity grows. Assume that R is bounded when t → +∞. In this case, the left-hand-side of
Eq. (26) tends toward infinity when t increases, so the right-hand-side has to do the same. In that case, r
becomes negligible over time, and the solution of Eq. (26) tends toward Eq. (27), which is not bounded
when t → +∞. This is in contradiction with our initial hypothesis.
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At high level of development, when disaster probability is very low, the capital at risk
grows at the same rate than economic growth. This is why the fraction at risk stabilizes at
high income, as shown in Fig.1.
When productivity is high, the average losses pXR has a growth rate equal to:
γL −→

t→+∞

γ
ν
1 − µ (1 + ν)

(30)

Average annual losses are thus growing less rapidly than economic growth at high
level of development, but they never decrease in absolute terms. At high development
level, the growth rate in annual disaster losses is equal to economic growth multiplied by
a “protection factor” (ν/(1+ν)), which depends only on the shape of the protection costs
and is lower than one.
The protection factor is also the income elasticity of average disaster losses (in a given
region, for a given hazard). It should not be confused with the income elasticity of disaster
damages (when a disaster occurs), which is larger than one.
In that case, the different terms of the economic surplus from at-risk capital (E[π] =
γt
e F (R, S) − C(p, R) − (r + pX)R) are growing at different rates. The production
γ
eγt F (R, S) and capital cost rR are growing at a rate 1−µ
. The protection costs and average
γ
ν
losses pXR are growing at a rate 1−µ 1+ν , i.e. more slowly than production. It means that
γ
when productivity tends to the infinity, the economic surplus is growing at the rate 1−µ
,
i.e. at the rate of risk-free economic growth.
4.2.1 Development and disaster trends
Appendix A shows that these results are unchanged if R and S are two production factors
in a Cobb-Douglas function. This analysis leads to three conclusions, concerning the
trends in capital at risk, average annual losses, and economic surplus.
Proposition 6 If (i) capital at risk and safe capital can be separated in the production
function or are two factors in a Cobb-Douglas function, (ii) protection costs grow less
than proportionally with the amount of capital to protect, and (iii) capital returns are
decreasing more rapidly than a threshold that depends on the convexity of protection cost
(i.e. if µ < ν/(1 + ν)), then economic losses in case of disaster (R) grow more rapidly
than risk-free economic growth, but their rate of growth converges toward the rate of riskfree economic growth as development proceeds. The relative vulnerability of the economy
(the “fraction at risk”) is thus increasing over time.
Proposition 7 The average annual disaster losses follow a bell-shaped curve in relative
terms with income: disaster losses are growing more rapidly than risk-free economic
growth at low stages of development and then keep growing in absolute terms but more
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slowly than risk-free economic growth at higher productivity levels. At high productivity, the growth rate of annual losses is the risk-free economic growth rate reduced by a
“protection factor” that depends only on the convexity of protection costs.
Proposition 8 The presence of risk reduces the economic surplus. But because of increasing risk-taking, the growth rate of economic surplus is larger than risk-free economic growth at low development level, and it tends to risk-free economic growth at high
development level.
As already stated, this result can be generalized to cases where C(p, R) = ξRc p−ν +
C0 and 0 ≤ c < 1. If c = 1, then protection is constant and average losses and capital at
risk grow at the same rate than economic growth.
Importantly, we do not need capital to be “more productive” in at-risk areas to have
capital at risk increasing more rapidly than risk-free economic growth and the capital
located in safe areas. We only need a separable production function with two decreasingreturn and imperfectly-substituable categories of capital (R and S), where R is related
to activities located in risk-prone areas. In that case, there is an incentive to invest in
at-risk areas to benefit from high marginal returns at low capital levels. Results are then
independent of the relative productivity α of the two capitals. The productivity ratio (α)
determines the ratio between the two capitals (S/R) at high development level.

5 Numerical application to New Orleans
We apply these formulations to the case of New Orleans, using the following illustrative
assumptions:
• The capitals are separable. The capital R is located in the flood-prone area of New
Orleans, and S is the capital located in safe areas in the rest of the region or the
country. The interest rate is r = 5 %.
• The area is fixed, and the protection costs depend only on the probability of occurrence p, not on the amount of capital to protect: C(p, R) = ξp−ν + C0 . In that case,
condition (11) is always verified, and p and R evolve in opposite directions.
• In absence of protection, the city would be flooded every year (p0 = 1).
• The cost of protecting New Orleans against category-3 storms is about $3 billion
in investment, and we assume a 10% per year maintenance cost; the probability of
such a storm is one out of 50 years. The annualized protection cost is C(1/50) =
$450 million per year, taking into account the cost of capital and maintenance costs.
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• Protecting New Orleans against category-5 hurricane floods would cost about $30
billion, with also a 10% per year maintenance cost, and the probability of such a
storm is one out of 200 years, so that C(1/200) = $4.5 billion per year.10
Even though each of these assumptions can be discussed, they provide an order of
magnitude for the cost of protecting the city. Using these assumptions, we have:

C(p) = ξ p−ν − p−ν
,
0

(31)

with p0 = 1, ν = 1.66, and ξ = 6.8 · 10−4.
For New Orleans, we assume that 50% of capital at-risk is lost in case of floods.
This large fraction translates the facts that part of the city is under normal sea level and
stayed flooded for weeks after Katrina hit the city, amplifying damages to houses and
buildings, and that floods occur through dike failure, leading to high water velocity and
large damages (RMS, 2005).
The production function is Y = eγt F (K) = λeγt Rµ , with µ = 0.3 and γ = 0.015
(total factor productivity grows by 1.5% per year). The risk-free growth rate, i.e. the
γ
growth in the capital S located in safe areas in the rest of the country, is 1−µ
≈ 2.1% per
year.
The variable Y is the local GDP in the flood-prone areas of New Orleans. Using
a New Orleans exposed population of 500,000 people, and the GDP per capita of New
Orleans ($24,000 per year in 2009), we have a city GDP of $12 billion. To estimate λ,
we solve numerically Eq. (26) to find R as a function of λ, and we chose λ so that the
income in absence of disaster is Y = λRµ = $12 billion (in economic data, protection
expenditures are included in income). The value is λ = 3.53. We find that the optimal
capital at risk in New Orleans is R = $59 billion, i.e. about 5 times the local income.
Losses in case of flood would be about $30 billion, which is consistent with data for the
flood due to Katrina (removing losses due to wind) (RMS, 2005). The optimal probability
of flood is found at 2.2% per year, i.e. a return period of 45 years (which is also close to
the return period of a category-3 hurricane, i.e. the current protection level in the city).
Then, we can solve numerically Eq. (26) for a series of t, to investigate the dependence
of risk to income. We can calculate the trend in R(t) and in average annual loss. We find
that R is growing at a rate 2.4% against 2.1% for the growth without risk. Average annual
losses due to floods are growing at a rate 1.5%, slower than economic growth. Thanks to
increased risk taking, the economic surplus π is growing at a rate 2.2%, i.e. more rapidly
than risk-free economic growth.
In the case of New Orleans, therefore, a rational decision-maker would make average
disaster losses increase less rapidly than economic growth (1.5 vs. 2.1%), but would
10

State officials estimated the cost of Category 5 protection between $2.5 and $32 billion (Carter, 2005;
Revkin and Drew, 2005; Schwartz, 2005). More recent and detailed estimates by Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration (LACPR, led by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers) reach even larger values.
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Figure 2: Annual growth rate of capital at risk R, average annual disaster losses, and
economic surplus growth rate, as a function of local income. The horizontal line is the
rate of risk-free economic growth. Growths in capital at risk and in economic surplus
are more rapid than economic growth at early development stage, and these growth rates
converge toward economic growth rate over time. Growth in average annual losses is
faster than risk-free economic growth at low income and slower at high income. The
vertical dashed line shows the current income in New Orleans.
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Figure 3: Optimal disaster probability of occurrence in New Orleans, as a function of
local income.

increase capital at risk more rapidly than risk-free growth (2.4 vs 2.1%). The consequence
is that the average cost of disasters is decreasing relative to regional or national wealth,
but the consequences when a flood occurs increase, even relatively to wealth. It means
that the New Orleans region evolves toward fewer disasters with consequences that are
growing relative to income, leading to an increased need for recovery and reconstruction
support.
One can investigate how this result depends on the local income in New Orleans (and
thus on total factor productivity), assuming that everything else remains unchanged (including protection costs C(p) and the fraction of capital at risk lost in case of flood X).
Results are reproduced in Fig. 2 and 3. Figure 2 shows the annual growth rates of capital
at risk R, of average annual losses (pXR), and of the economic surplus, as a function of
local income Y . The vertical line shows the current income in New Orleans, and the horizontal line the rate of risk-free economic growth. At very low productivity, the growth
in capital at risk R would be 4.6% per year, i.e. more than twice the rate of risk-free
economic growth. In this situation, the annual probability of flood would exceed 80%
(see Fig. 3). This growth then converges toward the rate of risk-free economic growth
(the horizontal dashed line) as development proceeds. The economic surplus growth rate
is also larger than the risk-free economic growth rate at low development level, and it
converges toward it as development proceeds.
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Figure 1 shows how the fraction at risk — i.e. the fraction of capital located in at
risk area — increases with income, assuming α = 2 (i.e., that in the absence of risk, this
fraction would be 38 percent, according to Eq. (24)).
For average annual disaster losses, the growth rate is 2.8% per year at low development
level, i.e. 40% faster than economic growth. At an income of 40 million USD per year in
the city, the growth rate of annual losses is equal to the rate of economic growth (2.1%),
and this growth rate keeps decreasing until 1.3% per year, which is economic growth
(2.1%) corrected by the “protection factor”, equal to 0.62 in the case of New Orleans.
In this case, therefore, the income elasticity of average disaster losses would be equal
to 0.62 (i.e. a 1% growth in the US would lead to a 0.62% growth in average annual losses)
and the income elasticity of disaster losses (when a disaster occurs) would be equal to 1.1
(i.e. a 1% growth in the US would lead a 1.1%-increase in the size of disasters when they
occur).

6 Taking into account biases in risk perception
This normative analysis suggests that capital-at-risk, losses in case of disasters, and average annual losses can increase with income, even in an optimal context with perfect
information and a benevolent social planner (at least in the case where human losses can
be avoided). Therefore, the observation that disaster losses increase over time does not
automatically mean that risk taking is excessive and should be suppressed by public action.
Interpreting real-world disaster loss data series requires a descriptive approach, where
realistic characteristics of decision-making and other sources of suboptimality are considered. There are many reasons why risk taking is very likely to be excessive in many cases
(and potentially insufficient in others).
First, there are externalities and moral hazard issues in risk taking and risk management. Insurance and post-disaster support are often available in developed countries, and
households and firms in risky areas do not pay the full cost of the risk, and may take more
risk than what is socially optimal (e.g., Kaplow, 1991; Burby et al., 1991; Laffont, 1995).
Also, Lall and Deichmann (2010), Hallegatte (2008) and Henriet et al (2012) show that
risk mitigation has positive externalities and that private and social costs of disaster losses
may differ, leading to inappropriate risk taking.
Here, we focus on the fact that risk perceptions are sometimes biased by information
constraints and cognitive and behavioral failures. Since the information on natural hazards
and risk is not always easily available, households and businesses may decide not to spend
the time, money and effort to collect them, and disregard this information in their decisionmaking process (Camerer and Kunreuther, 1989; and Hogarth and Kunreuther, 1995).
And individuals do not always react rationally when confronted to small probability risks.
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They for instance defer choosing between ambiguous choices (Tversky and Shafir 1992;
Trope and Lieberman, 2003). They do not always adequately take long and very longterm consequences into account (Kunreuther et al. 1978; Thaler, 1999). Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) proposed the prospect theory to better explain individual behaviors, taking
into account observed behaviors and experimental results.
In the following, we modify the model to account for some of these effects. We
assume that capital investment decisions are made with imperfect knowledge, or with biases in risk perception or behavior. This assumption is consistent with the observation that
most capital investment decisions are not made using all available disaster risk information. On the other hand, we model protection decisions as made with perfect knowledge
of natural risks and assuming (wrongly) that capital investment decisions will then also be
made optimally and with perfect knowledge. There is thus an inconsistency in the model
between protection decisions and capital investment decisions. This hypothesis is justified by the fact that (public and private) decisions concerning disaster protections (e.g.
the design of a dike system) are most of time designed through sophisticated risk analyses
taking into account all available information.
We borrow from the prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) the idea that
people weight different outcomes of a decision not using the probability of the outcome
(here, the probability of occurrence p), but a “decision weight” π. In a classical decisionmaking framework — based on expected utility maximization — π can be interpreted
as the perceived probability of disaster occurrence, and the difference between p and
π is the bias in risk perception. In a prospect theory framework, the decision weights
“should not be interpreted as measure of belief” but they can also be influenced by other
factors such as ambiguity (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). In this case, there are thus
two distinct issues: the misestimating of probability of occurrence (due for instance to
biased risk perception) and over- or under-weighting of some possible outcomes (which
is a preference, not a mistake).
In the model, π is used by investors to decide of the amount of capital to install in atrisk areas. In this section, we assume however that potential losses remain small enough
for the utility function (in an expected utility maximization framework) or the value function (in a prospect theory context) to remain linear.11 Equation (5) therefore becomes:
eγt ∂R F (R, S) − ∂R C − (πX + r) = 0

(32)

We investigate two ways of modeling the decision weight π. The first model assumes a
static relationship between the actual probability of occurrence p and the decision weight
π. The second model takes a dynamic view on risk perception and introduces myopic
adaptive expectations.
11

The reference point used by decision-makers to assess a situation is a situation with zero economic
surplus. As shown by Kahneman and Tversky, different reference points can lead to different behaviors.
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6.1 Systematic perception bias or decision weighting
A first model can be proposed where the relationship between p, the real probability of
occurrence, and π, the decision weight, can be represented as:
π = B(p)

(33)

Kahneman and Tversky (1979) propose that (i) the decision weight is higher than
probability for low probabilities; (ii) “subcertainty” means that π is less sensitive to
change in probabilities than perceived probability; (iii) π changes abruptly near the endpoints, with π(0) = 0 and π(1) = 1. One function that satisfies these conditions is:
0
if p < pmin
π(p) = 1
if p > pmax
β
pb + p
otherwise

(34)

Events with a probability below pmin are considered impossible; low-probability events
with probability higher than pmin are overweighted; and non-certain higher-probability
events are underweighted.
Since protection is done with perfect knowledge about the amount of installed capital,
1
 − 1+ν
RX
the actual probability of occurrence remains equal to p = νξ
. Calculation from
Section 4 can be redone with decision weight, leading to replace Eq. (26) by:
eγt λµRµ−1 = r + πX

(35)

At very high development level, protection is so high that p < pmin and disasters are
considered impossible. This may be the situation in the Netherlands for most decisionmakers. In that case, as in previous cases, the capital at risk R grows as fast as riskfree economic growth, and is higher than what is optimal in a rational framework. It is
therefore a situation of excessive risk taking.
At lower development level, p > pmin and we have:
eγt λµRµ−1 = r + Xpb + X



X
νξ

β
− 1+ν

β

R− 1+ν

(36)

In that case, a high productivity still leads to a situation where the fixed term r + Xpb
dominates the right hand side of Eq. (36), and the capital at risk R still grows as fast as
risk-free economic growth.
So at high development level, risk perception bias or a prospect theory decision framework still leads to a growth rate in capital at risk that is as fast as risk-free economic
growth, and thus to a growth rate in average annual losses that is lower than risk-free economic growth (namely, the risk-free rate reduced by the protection factor, like in previous
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cases). In this case, risk taking can be either excessive or insufficient compared with the
optimal situation (depending on the parameters of the risk function π).
Biases in risk perception change results at lower development level. If the fixed term
r + Xpb is dominated in the right hand side of Eq. (36), then the growth rate in capital at
risk R becomes:
γR =

γ
1−µ−

β
1+ν

(37)

In locations where capital at risk R and the protection level would be increasing with
economic growth (i.e., where the probability of occurrence p decreases), the presence of
a large underestimation (or underweighting) of risk (a large β) can lead to the opposite
outcome, that is a decrease of capital at risk and protection level over time.
β
If the growth rate of R is positive (µ < 1 − 1+µ
), then this growth rate increases with
β. It means that capital at risk increases more rapidly if hazards are more under-weighted.
Regardless of risk perception, however, the growth in capital at risk is larger than capital
in a risk-free situation, and the economy evolves toward more risk taking.
Average losses pXR have a growth rate equal to:
γL =

γ
1−

µ 1+ν
ν

+

1−β
ν

(38)

ν
In the situation in which protection improves over time, µ < 1+ν
, and in presence of
risk under-weighting, average losses increase over time, and they increase more rapidly
than when β = 1, and thus more rapidly than risk-free economic growth. In short, the
introduction of a systematic bias in risk perception (or of decision weights instead of
probabilities) does not change the main conclusion of this paper, namely that development
leads to more risk taking (capital at risk increases more rapidly than risk-free economic
growth). Biases in risk perception can however amplify this effect.
Even with biases in risk perception, situations where disaster losses increase more
rapidly than risk-free economic growth are not always situations where risk taking is
excessive: there are cases where risk taking is insufficient (compared with the social
optimum) but increases more rapidly than income. Again, the observation of trends in
economic losses should not be confused with conclusions on the presence of excessive
risk taking.

6.2 Myopic expectations
This modeling disregards the dynamics of risk perception. In practice, it is likely that
perceived risk is higher than actual risk during the years following an event, and lower
after some times and when the memory of disaster losses has lost its acuteness. After
Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans in 2005, the number of U.S. households with flood
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risk insurance increased by 53 percent a year, only to drop back to pre-Katrina levels
in three years, with a 33 percent cancellation rate. Meyer (2010) also shows that the
primary motivator of decisions to invest in disaster protection is the size of losses already
experienced in the past, not losses that were avoided or are predicted.
To account for these effects, a second model can be proposed where decisions on
the amount of capital to install in the risky area are based on a disaster probability that
is estimated empirically, based on previous disasters (see also, Hallegatte 2011). The
empirically estimated disaster probability is π and is given by:
1
π(t) =
τ

Z

u=t

e−

t−u
τ

F (u)du

(39)

u=−∞

Where F (u) is a Dirac distribution if a disaster occurs at time u, and zero otherwise.
This modeling corresponds to backward-looking adaptive expectation, in which past
events have an exponentially decreasing weight (with time scale τ ). In other terms, agents
assess future disaster risks from past events, with a memory characteristic time τ . The
consequence is that the estimated disaster probability is higher than the real one just after
a disaster, and lower than the real one when no disaster has occurred for a while. This
behavior appears consistent with many observations (e.g., Kunreuther and Slovic, 1978;
Tol et al., 1998).
The efficiency of this empirical process depends on the disaster probability. If there
are many disasters over a period τ (i.e. if 1/p << τ ), the estimated probability remains
close to the real one. If the memory is too short, i.e. if τ is too low, then the estimated
probability will often be different from the real one.
Here, we are interested in the dynamics between two disasters.12 Assuming that the
last disaster occurs at time t0 , we have F (t) = 0 for t > t0 , and:
1
π(t) =
τ

Z

u=t0

− t−u
τ

e
u=−∞

1
F (u)du +
τ

Z

u=t

e−

t−u
τ

F (u)du = π(t0 )e−

t−t0
τ

(40)

u=t0

Replacing p by π in Eq. (26) gives:
eγt λµRµ−1 = r + πX = r + Xπ(t0 )e−

t−t0
τ

(41)

When no disaster occurs during a long period of time, economic actors know that
disaster probability is low, then πX is very small compared with r, and the introduction
of myopic expectations does not change anything: capital at risk increases as fast as
economic growth.
But after disasters, where risk perception is high (π is large), then Eq. (41) can be
simplified, and the growth rate in capital at risk R is equal to:
12

A more complete dynamical analysis is made using a numerical model in Hallegatte (2011).
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γ + τ1
1
= γS +
γR =
1−µ
τ (1 − µ)
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(42)

In that case, therefore, capital at risk increases faster than the risk-free economic
growth (γS ). Here, the growth rate is independent of the shape of the protection cost
function (ν), and only depends on the expectation timescale τ . We have:
γL =

1
ν
ν
γ
+
1 − µ (1 + ν) τ (1 − µ) (1 + ν)

(43)

The last term of the equation is due to myopic expectations, and it leads to an increase
γ
in the growth rate of average annual losses. Since the risk-free growth is equal to 1−µ
, the
growth rate of annual losses can be either slower or faster than risk-free economic growth,
depending on the values of ν and τ .
After disasters, annual average losses are growing more rapidly than risk-free growth
if:
ν > γτ (1 − µ)

(44)

This is the case if protection costs increase rapidly with the desired safety standard (ν
is large), if expectation are short-sighted (τ is small), but also if economic growth is slow
(γ is small) or if the production function of capital at risk is close to constant return (µ is
close to one). Using parameter values from our New Orleans case study, this condition
is met if τ is lower than 158 years, which is a very long timescale. It seems therefore
possible that when disasters are relatively frequent, a dynamic bias in risk perception
leads to mean annual losses that increase more rapidly than risk-free economic growth.

7 Conclusion and discussion
This paper proposes an analytical framework to analyze the trade-off between disaster
losses and investment returns in areas at risk from natural hazards, and to explore the
relationship between development and risk taking. This issue is analyzed under various
assumptions on decision-making, including the presence of risk aversion, biases in risk
perception, and alternative decision theories such as the prospect theory.
In an optimal framework, and under conditions that ensure that protection improves
over time, the presence of risk and the possibility to protect against disasters lead to a
lower amount of capital in risky area (compared with the risk-free situation), but it also
increases the growth rate of capital at risk where protection costs increase less rapidly
than the amount of protected capital (i.e. where investments are at least partly done by
increasing capital density and concentration).
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By improving protection, economic development drives the economy toward more
risky behaviors (i.e. a growing share of capital is installed in at-risk areas). Protection
reduces the probability of occurrence of an event, but its impact on risk is more complex.
In particular, it transfers part of the risk from one kind of risk (frequent and low-cost
events) to another kind (exceptionnal and high-impact events).
Reciprocally, the increase in risk-taking is found to accelerate economic growth. Along
an optimal growth pathway, increasing risk-taking is thus both a driver and a consequence
of economic development. This interlinkage between development and risk taking suggests that risk should not be reduced at all cost, and that the observation of a trend in
disaster losses should not be confused with the presence of excessive risk taking.
Most econometric studies have focused on average losses (that mix the probability
of occurrence and the amount of losses in case of occurrence) and have left out of their
analysis the potential increase in damages when a disaster occur (e.g., Toya and Skidmore, 2007; Rashky, 2008). Current trends in disaster losses appear however consistent
with the prediction of this paper, namely a trend toward fewer but larger disasters (e.g.,
Etkin, 1999; Nordhaus, 2010; Bouwer et al., 2007; Pielke et al., 2008; Bouwer, 2011;
Schumacher and Strobl, 2011). These results are also in line with UN-ISDR (2009),
which observes that poor countries suffer from frequent and low-cost events, while rich
countries suffer from rare but high-cost events.
The paper suggests that natural disasters will become less frequent but more costly
with development and economic growth, and this result has some policy-relevant consequences. In particular, it means that development requires more resilience, i.e. an
improved ability to deal with and recover from rare events, which exceed the protection
capacity. The Tohoku Pacific earthquake could thus be an illustration of the type of events
the world will have to deal with in the future. Such a trend toward larger disasters translates into a strong and increasing need for crisis management and post-disaster support,
through (1) forecasts and early warning to mitigate human losses (e.g., Subbiah et al.,
2008; Hallegatte 2012); (2) rainy-day funds and insurance and reinsurance schemes to
support reconstruction (e.g., Ghesquiere and Mahul, 2010; Jaffee et al., 2010; MichelKerjan, 2010); and (3) new international instruments for post-disaster support and solidarity (e.g., Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 2009). Finally, the growing role of exceptional disasters, on which knowledge and data is the scarcest, call for decision-making processes that
are able to cope with large uncertainty (Lempert and Collins, 2007; Paté-Cornell, 2012;
Hallegatte et al., 2012).
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Bouwer, L. M., R. P. Crompton, E. Faust, P. Höppe, and R. A. Pielke Jr., 2007. Confronting disaster losses. Science, 318, 753.
Bouwer, L. M., 2011. Have disaster losses increased due to anthropogenic climate
change?. Bull. Amer. Meteor. Soc., 92, 39–46.
Burby, R. J., B. A. Cigler, S. P. French, E. J. Kaiser, J. Kartez, D. Roenigk, D. Weist,
and D. Whittington, 1991. Sharing Environmental Risks: How to Control Governments’
Losses in Natural Disasters. Boulder, CO: Westview.
Camerer, C. and H. Kunreuther, 1989. Decision Processes for Low Probability Events:
Policy Implications. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 8, 565-592.
Carter, N.T., 2005. New Orleans Levees and Floodwalls: Hurricane Damage Protection, CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RS22238, September 6, 2005.
Ciccone, A., 2002. Agglomeration effects in Europe, European Economic Review 46
(2002) 213–227
Ciccone, A., and R. E. Hall, 1996. Productivity and the density of economic activity,
The American Economic Review, 86(1), 54–70
Ehrlich, I., Becker, G.S., 1972. Market insurance, self-insurance, and self-protection.
The Journal of Political Economy 80, 623-648.
Etkin D., 1999. Risk transference and related trends: driving forces towards more
mega-disasters. Environmental Hazards 1, 69–75
Fomby, T., Y. Ikeda, and N. Loayza. 2011. The Growth Aftermath of Natural Disasters. Journal of Applied Econometrics. DOI: 10.1002/jae.1273.
Ghesquiere, Francis, and Olivier Mahul, 2010. Financial Protection of the State
against Natural Disasters: A Primer. Policy Research Working Paper Series 5429, World
Bank, Washington, DC.
Hallegatte, S., 2008: An adaptive regional input-output model and its application to
the assessment of the economic cost of Katrina, Risk Analysis 28(3), 779-799.
Hallegatte, S., 2011. How economic growth and rational decisions can make disaster
losses grow faster than wealth, Policy Research Working Paper 5617, The World Bank.
Hallegatte, S., 2012a. A Cost Effective Solution to Reduce Disaster Losses in Developing Countries: Hydro-Meteorological Services, Early Warning, and Evacuation, Policy
Research Working Paper 6058, The World Bank.
Hallegatte, S., A. Shah, R. Lempert, C. Brown, S. Gill, 2012b. Investment decisionmaking under deep uncertainty - application to climate change. Policy Research Working
Paper 6193, The World Bank.

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2013

27

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 780 [2013]

28

Henriet, F., S. Hallegatte, L. Tabourier, 2012. Firm-Network Characteristics and Economic Robustness to Natural Disasters, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 36,
150-167.
Hogarth, R., and H. Kunreuther, 1995. Decision Making Under Ignorance: Arguing
with Yourself. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 10, 15-36.
IPCC, 2012: Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation. A Special Report of Working Groups I and II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Field, C.B., V. Barros, T.F. Stocker, D. Qin, D.J.
Dokken, K.L. Ebi, M.D. Mastrandrea, K.J. Mach, G.-K. Plattner, S.K. Allen, M. Tignor,
and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, and New York,
NY, USA, 582 pp.
Jaffee D., H. Kunreuther, and E. Michel-Kerjan, 2010. Long Term Property Insurance,
Risk Management and Decision Processes Center, The Wharton School of the University
of Pennsylvania.
Kahn, M., 2005. The death toll from natural disasters: the role of income, geography,
and institutions. Review of Economics and Statistics 87 (2), 271–284.
Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky, 1979. Prospect theory. Econotnetrica 47(2), pp. 263292.
Kaplow, L., 1991. Incentives and government relief for risk. Journal of Risk and
Uncertainty 4(2), 167-175.
Kellenberg, D. K., and A. M. Mobarak, 2008: Does rising income increase or decrease
damage risk from natural disasters? J. Urban Econ., 63, 722–802.
Kunreuther, H., and P. Slovic, 1978. Economics, psychology, and protective behavior.
The American Economic Review, 68(2), Papers and Proceedings of the Ninetieth Annual
Meeting of the American Economic Association, pp. 64–69
Kunreuther, H., R. Ginsberg, L. Miller, P. Sagi, P. Slovic, B. Borkan, and N. Katz,
1978. Disaster Insurance Protection: Public Policy Lessons. John Wiley and Sons, New
York.
Kunreuther, H., and E. Michel-Kerjan. 2012. Impact of Behavioral Issues on Green
Growth Policies and Weather-Related Disaster Reduction in Developing Countries. Paper
presented at the Green Growth Knowledge Platform inaugural conference, Mexico City,
January 12–13.
Laffont, J.J., 1995. Regulation, moral hazard and insurance of environmental risks,
Journal of Public Economics 58(3), 319–336
Lall S. V, and Deichmann U., 2010. Density and disasters: economics of urban hazard
risk. Policy Research Working Paper 5161, The World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Linnerooth-Bayer, J., Warner, K., Bals, C., Höppe, P., Burton, I., Loster, T., Haas, A.,
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A Capital at risk and safe capital as substituable inputs
in a Cobb-Douglas function
If R and S are imperfectly substituable, we can assume that F (R, S) = λRµ1 S µ2 . This
section demonstrates that this situation is similar to the situation where R and S are separable in the production function.
In this case, the marginal productivity of S gives us:
S=
With p =



RX
νξ

1
− 1+ν



eγt λµ2
r

1
 1−µ

2

µ1

R 1−µ2

(45)

, we have:
pX = X



X
νξ

1
− 1+ν

1

R− 1+ν

(46)

and the marginal productivity of R gives us:
λµ1



λµ2
r

µ2
 1−µ

2

e

γt
1−µ2

R

µ1 +µ2 −1
1−µ2

=r+X



X
νξ

1
− 1+ν

1

R− 1+ν

(47)

Here, we can use the same approach as before.

A.1

Low development level

At low level of development, and using the same assumptions on p0 , pX is larger than r,
and the equation can be approximated by assuming that r << pX, which gives:
R(t) = R0 e

γ
1−µ
1−(µ1 +µ2 )− 1+ν2

t

(48)

µ1 +2µ2
2
So R is increasing if 1 − (µ1 + µ2 ) > 1−µ
, i.e. if ν > 1−µ
. Using classical values
1+ν
1 −µ2
for decreasing return (i.e. µ1 + µ2 ≈ 0.3), and assuming that the capital at risk and the
safe capital have the same exponent, it leads to ν > 0.64, which is the case if protection
costs are convex.
Since economic growth in absence of risk would be 1−(µγ1 +µ2 ) , the capital at risk increases more rapidly than risk-free economic growth. Average losses E[L] = pXR are
growing at a rate:

γL =

γ
1 − (µ1 + µ2 ) −

1−µ2
1+ν

ν
ν +1

(49)

Average losses increase more rapidly than risk-free economic growth if:
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1 − (µ1 + µ2 ) −

1−µ2
1+ν

γ
ν
>
ν +1
1 − (µ1 + µ2 )
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(50)

If R is increasing, then the denominator is positive, and this inequality is always verified. So, in this setting, at low level of development and under mild conditions insuring
that the probability of occurrence decreases with time, average disaster losses increase
more rapidly than risk-free economic growth.

A.2

High development level

At high level of development, pX is very small compared with r, and the equation can be
solved by assuming at pX = 0:
γ

R(t) = R0 e 1−(µ1 +µ2 )

t

(51)

Which is also the rate of risk-free economic growth. Average losses E[L] = pXR are
then growing at a rate:
γL =

ν
γ
1 − (µ1 + µ2 ) ν + 1

(52)

In this case, the growth rate of disaster losses is lower than the rate of risk-free economic growth. Indeed, the growth rate in annual disaster losses is equal to economic
growth multiplied by the same “protection factor” ν/(1 + ν) as in the case of a separable
production function.
Proposition 9 The case where R and S are substituable inputs in a Cobb-Douglas function is equivalent to the case where the production function is separable.
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B Taking into account risk aversion
The present analysis does not include risk aversion, following Arrow and Lind (1970). It
thus assumes that the social planner who determines the appropriate level of risk ensures
that (i) aggregate losses remain limited compared with national income; (ii) there is risk
sharing across individuals in the country to avoid large individual losses13 ; and (iii) there
is temporal smoothing of disaster losses, through savings and borrowing (self-insurance)
or reinsurance. In absence of these elements, risk aversion needs to be taken into account.
This is the case, for instance, in small countries where the entire economy can be affected
(as in Grenada after hurricane Ivan in 2004 where losses reached 200% of GDP) and
where the risk-free level of capital R (Rs ) would be large compared with the rest of the
economy.
To take into account risk aversion, we need to introduce an utility function, which we
assume to depend on the economic surplus u(π) and to have decreasing returns u′ (π) >
0 and u′′ (π) < 0. The utility cost of disasters can be approximated by the insurance
premium δ that the region would be ready to pay to avoid all losses, which is defined by:
u(π0 − δ) = pu(π0 − L) + (1 − p)u(π0 )

(53)

where π0 is the surplus in absence of disaster and is equal to eγt F (R, S) − C(p, R) −
r(R + S). This equation defines a function δ(p, R, S, t), which replaces pXR in Eq. (3)
when risk aversion is accounted for.
π
e

z
}|
{
E[u] = eγt F (R, S) − C(p, R) − r(R + S) − δ(p, R, S, t)

(54)

maxp,R,S π
e
s.t.0 ≤ p ≤ p0

(55)


( 1 )
δ = π0 − p(π0 − RX)1−ρ + (1 − p)π01−ρ 1−ρ

(56)

And the maximization program becomes:

We use a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function under the form u =
then we have:

π 1−ρ
,
1−ρ

Since δ > pRX in presence of positive risk aversion, the taking into account of risk
aversion makes perceived risk larger and creates a non-linearity between R and risk. To
go further, the optimization program can be solved numerically with the parameters and
13

Since fatalities and casualties cannot be shared, it means that forecasts and early warning systems
reduce human losses, as is observed in most developed countries where economic losses have increased
while human losses have decreased.
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Figure 4: Evolution of the “fraction at risk”, i.e. the share of capital at risk R in total
capital R + S, as a function of time, with and without risk aversion. Risk aversion reduces
the fraction at risk at all development levels. Calculations using numerical values from
New Orleans (see Section 5) and α = 2.

functional forms from Section 5 on New Orleans, and using the same methodology to
calibrate λ. Since risk aversion introduces total income in the equations of R and p, it
creates a link between R and S even when the two capitals are separable in the production
function. It means that the value of S (i.e. α) also needs to be calibrated. In practice, the
value of S depend on how disaster risks in New Orleans are shared with risk-free capital
(or capital that is subject to a risk independent of hurricane risk). As an illustration,
equations are solved assuming that α = 2.
Results for the fraction at risk are presented in Fig. 4, for a risk aversion ρ = 2. It
shows that risk aversion leads to locating less capital in at risk areas, at all development
levels.
Figure 5 shows that risk aversion has an ambiguous impact on the probability of occurrence: at low development level, the capital at risk is so much smaller with risk aversion
that it is optimal to increase the probability of occurrence; at higher development level,
risk aversion leads to better protection and to a decrease in the probability of occurrence.
Finally, Fig. 6 shows that capital at risk still grow more rapidly than income at all development levels, and the growth rate converges toward the risk-free growth rate. At high
development level and in this simulation, the capital at risk is lower but increases more
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Figure 5: Evolution of the annual probability of occurrence, without risk aversion and
with risk aversion (ρ = 2).

rapidly with risk aversion than without risk aversion. At high development level, average
annual losses grow at a lower rate than risk-free economic growth, like in the case without
risk aversion.
Numerical simulations suggest therefore that the qualitative results in the case without
risk aversion remain valid with risk aversion. An exploration of various values of risk
aversion (ρ) and of various risk sharing level (modeled through α here) confirms that
results are robust to the presence of risk aversion.
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Figure 6: Evolution of capital at risk R and average annual disaster losses as a function
of time, without risk aversion and with risk aversion (ρ = 2).
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